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Faith and Society

DAISUKE KITAGAWA

Society constitutes an object of the Church's serious concern primarily as the habitat of man in history. As such society needs to be fully understood by the Church if she is to carry out her mission and ministry to mankind, anywhere at any time. This in brief is the perspective in which this paper is written.

1

Man in history is at once a child of nature and a child of society. Man, however, is not merely an integral part of mother nature but is capable of studying, analysing, and transcending it, as Reinhold Niebuhr has definitely explicated in his *Nature and Destiny of Man*. This does not make man either unnatural or super-natural but it simply means that he can be an intelligent collaborator with, and manipulator of, the forces of nature. As such man creates society to protect himself from nature's destructive forces and to exploit its creative forces for his benefit. At the same time, man the creator of society finds himself a child of society as well; that is to say, society created by man eventually shapes his personality. It is this aspect of society, namely society as the habitat of man's soul, or the context in which man grows into a person, that this paper is all about.

The society which constitutes the habitat of modern man anywhere in the world is now nothing less than *cosmopolis* in that it is, first of all, world-wide both in its content and context, and then it is increasingly urban both in its orientation and character, and finally it is growing more and more secular both in its outlook (*Weltanschauung*) and behaviour. Hence it is already difficult, and will increasingly become impossible, to distinguish between domestic and foreign social issues; man's life tends to be more and more governed, controlled, and even directed, not by himself but by invisible forces, hidden and imbedded in the social structure; and man, still a free moral agent and

decision-maker, makes *his* decisions, not with reference to what might happen to him in "the life to come" but in "the here and now", or in the immediately foreseeable future.

What place does faith have in modern man's life in such a society? How is the Christian Faith as embodied in the Anglican heritage to come to terms with it? Those are the questions to which we must presently come.

2

Naked nature has long ceased being man's immediate environment, at least since the transition from the palaeolithic to the neolithic civilization. With the invention of agriculture, the seed of urban civilization was sown and, ever since, man's environment has been more than nature.¹ For, when man moved out of the "food-collecting" stage into the "food-producing" stage of culture, he put an end to his utter dependence on nature and began to tame its naked forces to his advantage.²

Now, according to Boulding, the great transition from pre-civilized to civilized society has been running its course for the past five or even ten thousand years and is at present approaching its completion, only to be followed on its heels by another great transition from civilized to post-civilized (or technological, or even developed) society. Human society the world over is caught up in this great transition, which in its turn is throwing mankind into an historically unprecedented state of uncertainty (objectively) and agony (subjectively), both individually and collectively. What St Paul said in a totally different context is peculiarly applicable to this situation. "Up to the present, we know, the whole created universe groans in all its parts as if in the pangs of childbirth" (Rom. 8.22 *NEB*).

Professor Boulding's so-called first great transition culminated in what we have known as the industrial civilization, which has within it the dynamics which makes inevitable the second great transition towards the technological civilization. This transition has already been in process for some time and can in no wise be curbed let alone stopped. The problem is not the transition of society from one stage to another but man caught up in its process, who, not comprehending its meaning, attempts either to drift along aimlessly into the unknown future or to resist it hanging on to the familiar past. Man is on the verge of abrogating his prerogative as the creator of society and reducing himself to be nothing but its victim. Or, to put it differently,

instead of positively participating in the creative process of shaping the society of tomorrow, man is being hopelessly left behind it as he hangs on for dear life to the familiar shape of the society of yesterday. Thus conditioned, his life of today is bound to become nothing but an abortive enterprise despite all the anxieties he suffers and the immense amount of hard work he puts in.

The present shape and condition of human society are both legacies of the Industrial Revolution of the mid-eighteenth century which, it may be safely said, marks the continental divide of the history of human civilization up to now. Human society has become qualitatively different since the Industrial Revolution; that is, it has become in terms of economics an industrial society, whereas previously it had been an agricultural-mercantile society, which we may call, for brevity's sake, the pre-industrial society.

There are many different ways in which to describe the difference between the pre-industrial and industrial society, but for our purpose it may suffice to point out that the most basic difference lies in the relation of man to nature. That is to say, in the pre-industrial society man still was pretty much tied down to nature in that man's wealth depended almost exclusively on what nature provided for him. Agricultural production depended much more upon the natural climate and the kind of soil, than on technique developed by man, while trade was little more than exchanging one kind of product for another kind between people living in different places. Money then was entirely a means for exchange, not a capital. Both science and technology in their primitive forms did exist in the pre-industrial civilization to help man "make his peace with nature very largely as an individual—as a farmer, a hunter, a fisherman, a sailor",³ but not much more.

In contrast, what we know as industrial civilization is to a large extent a product of man's newly disciplined application of science and technology infinitely more advanced than they had been before the Industrial Revolution. Having brought the industrial civilization into being, modern science and technology continue to govern both the process of industry and man's life within the industrial economy with which man can only "make his peace through social organization", not as an individual.⁴

Whereas in the pre-industrial society man's habitat was still deeply and directly rooted in nature, in the industrial society it is much more removed from nature itself. For technology, which governs the whole

process of modern industry, "itself demands organization in order to function, and the environment it creates in turn calls forth organization in order for men to function within it".⁵ Modern man is thus compelled to live in an increasingly highly organized or structured society.

3

The problem which confronts mankind as a whole today and to which the Church is challenged to address itself is that when the industrially advanced sector of the world is about to enter the post-industrial stage of civilization, the industrially underdeveloped sector is still to a great extent pre-industrial in its basic orientation. To confuse the problem further, the two sectors are now, more than ever, inextricably bound to each other, again due to the very nature of industrial civilization itself. That is to say, the problem of the industrially advanced sector of the world (i.e. the West or the North Atlantic community of nations, including Canada, the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R.) and the rest of the world (i.e. Africa, Asia, including the Middle East and the Far East as well as the Islands of the Pacific, and Latin America), cannot be dealt with separately. For technology is all-pervading and technology-governed industrial civilization has, through the colonial imperialism of the West, penetrated throughout the world. The world has been compressed into one global entity, and "as a result what was once a gulf which divided two wholly separate worlds is rapidly becoming a rift which divides one self-conscious human community".⁶

Owing to the dynamics of technology, human society, governed by it, knows no national or any other kind of geographical boundaries, nor the differences in ethnic, religious, and cultural background that exist within one human race. Technology has turned the whole world into a neighbourhood (the eclipse of distance), simultaneously making a potential microcosm of every local community, which in turn means that, among other things, none, whether an individual or a group, can stand alone very long. Rich or poor, strong or weak, clever or stupid—it makes no difference; no person, no institution, no nation can be entirely self-sufficient any longer.

What is more serious, according to Heilbroner, is "a loss of social mastery, of control over our own habitat. We are in the unpleasant position of watching our *society* change under the impact of its own technology while we stand impotently by and suffer the consequences

for better or worse.”⁷ Thus the industrial society as we know it is moving towards an ever highly organized society in which the locus of power will have shifted from the possessors of wealth (and wisdom and weapons, one may add) to the possessors of collective expertise. Neither stock-holders, individually or collectively, nor managers, nor organized labour can have control over industries, for the locus of power has long shifted to an organized body of technical experts.

Such an interlocking structure of specialists, technicians, experts, and organization men who collectively guide the giant corporation is what Professor John Kenneth Galbraith calls a “techno structure” in his new book, *The New Industrial State*.⁸ One must not forget at this juncture that every business corporation, every industrial firm is global in its operation both in terms of acquisition of raw materials and marketing of manufactured goods. Moreover, it is in this context that several knotty issues raise their ugly heads: ethnic nationalism in developing areas, racism (both of which are sometimes coupled with religious bigotry), chronic poverty of masses of people in the midst of plenty, and, last but not least, disintegration of personality on the part of growing numbers of people who are otherwise quite well to do, especially in the technologically more advanced countries.

4

To grapple with these issues with any degree of objectivity, one needs to turn to history and to learn how the industrial revolution happened to take place in the England of the mid-eighteenth century and to provide the impetus for the Western colonial expansion.

The industrial revolution transformed England from an essentially commercial and agricultural society into an industrial society, that is, from a more tradition-bound and therefore relatively static society to a more forward-looking, adventurous, and therefore dynamic society. Once industrialized, England had to expand, to enlarge not necessarily her territory but her sphere of economic influence. Her colonies scattered all over the world took on new significance for England.

To be sure, maritime colonial imperialism of the Western powers antedates the industrial revolution, but the industrial revolution radically changed the character of colonial imperialism. This difference is conspicuously notable when one compares Spanish and Portuguese colonies in South America and British, Dutch, French, and German colonies in Asia and Africa.

Most of Asia, virtually all of Asia except China and Japan, was first colonized early in the sixteenth century by the Iberian empire but later taken over by the Dutch, French, and British, whereas the entire continent of South America remained colonies of Spain and Portugal until the beginning of the nineteenth century. Most of Africa except the Cape Colony and the coastal areas possessed by Portugal (Mozambique and Angola) remained a dark continent to the rest of the world until the latter part of the nineteenth century. The southern tip of the continent was occupied by the Dutch East India Company from the middle of the seventeenth century, and reinforced by a group of Huguenots towards the end of that century who, though only 200 in number, brought with them their families, their industries, and their special skills, all of which the settlement sorely needed. Within two generations Dutch burghers and French Huguenots became one people, ancestors of the present-day Afrikaners, who until recently remained largely agriculturalists and traders of a pre-industrial type. The Cape Colony was first occupied by the British in 1795 and became a British possession in 1814. One cannot fail to see the seed of a potentially bitter conflict sown there and then when post-industrial revolution Britain came to rule the population, the majority of whom were pre-industrial agricultural colonists.⁹

One of the characteristic differences between the pre- and post-industrial revolution colonialisms is that the former looked upon the colonies as territorial annexations, while to the latter the importance of colonies rested in their being suppliers of raw materials and potential markets for the manufactured goods. To illustrate, South American countries were made integral parts of the Iberian empire at the height of its medieval feudalism.

In contrast, British and Dutch, and to a certain extent French colonies in Asia were ruled in such a way that they might eventually stand on their own feet as partners in the rapidly growing industrial economy. This was the only way to make colonies a paying proposition from the standpoint of the industrial nations.

Colonization of sub-Saharan Africa became a competitive enterprise (scramble for Africa) among the Western powers with the Berlin Conference 1884-5. With the exception of the Portuguese colonies, the rest of Africa south of the Sahara was colonized, by and large, by industrial nations of the West for primarily economic interest. One must not forget that David Livingstone's exploration

of the dark continent had as its stated objective, "Christianity and commerce" to replace the slave-trade.

In the meantime, the industrial civilization, by way of the colonization of English people, has developed to the greatest extent on the North American continent, especially in the United States of America. This is understandable, for industrial civilization requires constant innovation, exploration, and experimentation and therefore it cannot go very well with tradition-bound societies. Of all the countries on the face of the earth, the U.S.A. was then the least tradition-bound nation, after having thoroughly alienated the aboriginal population in their own land. Furthermore, the U.S.A., which started out as a British colony, soon not only became an independent nation but acquired an enormous territory, largely by conquering the western frontiers through internal migration. It must also be remembered that the American War of Independence roughly coincided with the industrial revolution in the old Europe, which means that the U.S.A. began its national career as an industrial nation almost from its inception.

The victory of the North in the Civil War assured the advance of the U.S.A. as an industrial nation, hampered by no centuries-old traditions, unlike any other nations of the world, including England. So, Monroe Doctrine or not, by 1914 the U.S.A. became the greatest industrial power in the world, and as such the impact of the U.S. economy was being felt everywhere on the face of the globe, but more especially among her closest neighbours to the south. That is to say, the U.S.A. having no colony anywhere in the world managed to become economically the most powerful nation in the world, owing to the dynamism of her industrial economy.

Call this American economic imperialism if you will, the truth is the dynamic character of industrial civilization itself, which the U.S.A. shared with England and with other European colonial powers. What is of decisive importance for us is to learn that industrialism knows no geographical limitation, and where an industrial nation finds itself among pre-industrial nations, the former is destined to behave like a colonial imperialist toward the latter. By so doing the industrial nation is bound to bring the pre-industrial nation into the same economic orbit as its own, first as the exploiter of their natural resources and manpower, then by using them as the market for the manufactured goods of its industry, and finally, however reluctantly, as its potential partner. This is precisely what is

happening between the recently de-colonized countries in the so-called developing areas and their former colonial powers.

This means, then, that industrial civilization is bound to subvert the sovereignty of the nation-state as such. In the words of Professor Geoffrey Barraclough,

When, at the beginning of 1917, President Wilson proclaimed that "there must be not a balance of power, but a community of power, not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace", he was in effect giving notice that, in an age of world politics, the old structure of international relations had become obsolete.¹⁰

What Professor Barraclough calls "world politics" over against "international relations" is indeed an inevitable by-product, if not a legitimate child, of that civilization which emerged out of the industrial revolution of the mid-nineteenth century, of which the U.S.A. and all the Western colonial powers have been at once the products and the distributors throughout the world.

5

This at last brings us to the crux of the problems which I have earlier listed. The peculiar kinds of ethnic nationalism, racism, and religious bias in the developing countries are closely interrelated to one another, and they together are inseparable from the chronic poverty of large masses of people in those countries. And, be it noted, all these issues have come to a head as an inevitable result of the penetration of industrial civilization into their midst through the colonial imperialism of Western industrial powers.

The basic trouble lies in the fact that though colonial rule has brought the colonies into the same orbit of industrial economy, it has failed to industrialize their national economy. Colonies have remained suppliers of raw materials and buyers of manufactured goods and have not become manufacturers even after they gained political independence. That is to say, they are merely and exclusively consumers within the context of modern world-wide industrial economy, not producers. This makes their predicament doubly difficult, for had they not become consumers of the industrial products, they would not have become as dependent on them as they now are; and it will be long before they can produce them for and by themselves.

It is true that the measure of industrialization that took place under the Western colonial rule has elevated the *per capita* cash income of the colonies, but seldom to the extent that they could save and invest

after they have paid for their daily necessities (which in pre-colonial days they used to produce for themselves). The trouble is right here and is glaring at all the industrial powers. The world which is rapidly becoming one global social system is now divided into the majority of the abjectly poor and the minority of the grossly rich. This condition has existed for a long, long time and the poor sectors of the world were always dimly aware of it, but they used to accept it "as a matter of immutable fate, as an inscrutable destiny", but they no longer will. It has now become suddenly "a dispensation of human history which seems iniquitous, intolerable, and infuriating. Their economic development, their catching up, becomes not just a matter of social policy, but of social justice".¹¹

As to the ever-growing economic gap between the developed and developing countries, many experts have spoken and written with indisputable statistical evidence, which need not be repeated here.

What is commonly referred to as "the revolution of rising expectation" is not fiction but a reality. The thing which needs to be much more fully understood by everybody in the industrially advanced nations is that the predicament of the developing nations is every bit his responsibility as much as theirs.

Their predicament stems from the plain fact that the colonial rule, having brought their society into the orbit of world-wide industrial economy, left them without developing either the capital or the skills among them, both of which are absolutely necessary prerequisites to produce industrial goods. Under the colonial rule, a tiny fraction of the population were turned into a Westernized intellectual élite, while some of the soil-bound peasants were compelled to become unskilled industrial proletariat, and a small proportion of people became artisans, but practically none rose to be *entrepreneurs*.

There may be a sense in which most of Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the wake of decolonization find themselves in pretty much a similar economic state as England was on the eve of the industrial civilization, except on two accounts. In the first place, England then had a large upper-middle stratum of commercial bourgeoisie thanks to a century of successful exploration and slave-trading, etc. In the second place, England had, as part of her cultural heritage, the legacies of a series of intellectual revolutions such as the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, etc., leading up to the rise of modern science. Consequently, as much a tradition-bound society as she was, England as a nation had within herself the dynamic trends

which were necessary for such a drastic social change as the industrial revolution to take place.

In comparison, all the ex-colonies of the Western powers are without exception societies tightly bound to antiquarian traditions and none of them has, in its own cultural heritage, anything comparable to the Renaissance and the subsequent intellectual revolutions in the West. Confronted by the dynamic power of the industrial economy imposed on them by the colonial powers, their traditional social structure began to crumble easily long before they were ready to build in its place an industrial society. And, intentionally or otherwise, the colonial rule has not helped them very much in this respect. The result is that those who used to live in subsistence economy have been willy-nilly brought into the realm of industrial economy, however marginally, only to continue the same old hand-to-mouth pattern of existence, except that they have to use cash. Their society has never become one "in which wealth *can* be accumulated and in which incomes and employment are *capable* of being progressively enlarged", and without such a society industrial economy cannot begin to develop.¹²

Politically independent but economically forced to be more than ever dependent, the developing nations' plight is deep and complex, far more deep and complex than people in the West may think; and, unless the industrially advanced nations intelligently share in some form or other of corporate effort for its solution, it will more than likely disrupt the whole of human society. At the level of economics and technology, the solution is utterly impossible apart from the combination of foreign trade, foreign capital investment, and foreign aid programmes, which also have grave built-in dangers unless much better conceived, much more efficiently executed, and at a much more accelerated pace than anything we have known before. This point has been stressed by many experts in many circles including the World Conference on Church and Society, Geneva, July 1966, and does not need to be elaborated here.¹³

6

Various forms of aid programmes from the developed to the developing countries are difficult enough problems, but a more serious problem lies at the moment on the part of the aid-receiving nations which calls for a high degree of intellectual sophistication as well as of moral commitment on the part of the aid-giving nations. It is this

problem that has been manifesting itself as ethnic nationalism and racism, which in certain areas are undergirded by the renascent traditional religions. And the problem, as we shall see, is pregnant with opportunity for the new life as well as with dangers for the old. It may be added, simply to refresh our memory, that the problem we are now dealing with is also a legacy of the Western colonial imperialism.

Disintegration of traditional institutions and values under the impact of the West has been widely taking place throughout the rest of the world, including the "political" East, namely the Soviet zone, and Indian nations of the Americas as well as African peoples transplanted to the Americas. It may also be stated parenthetically that transplanted Europeans, for example, Spanish and Portuguese in South America, Afrikaners in South Africa, have been faced with the same problem under the impact of the post-industrial revolution West along with the indigenous population whom they had conquered in pre-industrial times.

What happened in all these areas is that under the impact of the dynamic, self-expanding, industrial West, the tradition-bound and more or less static societies were left with no choice but to be swallowed up by it in order to survive. Survive they did, but at the expense of their own cultural integrity. Their societies soon came to be governed, not by the traditional aristocracy or tribal chieftain, but by the Western-educated intellectuals and the technically trained professionals. Veneration of age has been replaced, among the newly rising generation at least, by respect for power vested in money, scientific knowledge, technical expertise, and with this change began the process of disintegration of the age-old communal structure and value systems. The colonial rule unabashedly welcomed this process and in the name of modernization consistently encouraged its acceleration, except where, as in northern Nigeria, the principle of "Indirect Rule" (*à la* Lord Lugard) was established. Also deserving a special mention in this context is the historical fact that the nineteenth-century Protestant missionary movement, along with the Western industries overseas, has, either by design or unwittingly, contributed substantially to the acceleration of the process of social disintegration, as much as it liberated individuals in those areas from the tyrannical oppression of their pre-industrial social systems.¹⁴

When, in the wake of the Second World War, political independence was gained by most of the former colonies of the Western

powers, it was to that small minority of the élite, the newly emergent Westernized intellectuals, that the power to govern the countries was transferred from the colonial governments, wherein is the root of the problem. (The term "intellectuals" is used advisedly, for those people of whom we are talking are not "the middle class" as understood in Europe and North America.)

These intellectuals in the developing nations are gallantly responding to the challenge of the West. They are the most precious and tangible legacy of Western colonialism. They are the product of the Western industrial civilization and as such are capable of meeting the challenge of the dynamic ever self-expanding West *in terms of the West*. For this very reason, they are those with whom the West has most of the direct dealings, whether in terms of inter-governmental relations, or in business transactions, or even in inter-church affairs. This is inevitable and in itself should be neither lamented nor condemned; but it must also not be overlooked that this brings about an exceedingly complicated situation.

The problem with which we are concerned is inherent in the precarious position in which the intellectuals are caught. These people are placed in the well-nigh impossible position of having simultaneously and constantly (*a*) to rediscover the national identity of their own country, which had been all but lost under colonial rule, as one of the prerequisites for nation-building. (It is in this context that Mr Nehru wrote *The Discovery of India*); (*b*) to reorientate the relationship of their now independent nation with the West; and at the same time, (*c*) to carry with them and represent the interest of the masses of their country who, by and large, have been left untouched by the creative aspects of Western civilization despite the fact that their society has been shaken to its foundations by the impact of the Western industrial economy without fully understanding what it all amounts to; and (*d*) to do this, not only within their own country, but in relation to all the nations of the world including their former colonial masters, within the institutional framework of the United Nations, a creation of the Western powers.

One cannot help wondering who in the West would be equal to such a task. Those intellectuals in the developing nations have thus to be nationalists and internationalists at the same time; they have to walk on the tightrope between "the polar extremes of xenophobia and xenophilia"; they have at once to be exalting their own people's past and to be critical of it, so as to be able to guide their followers

to be emancipated, with self-respect and pride, from the tyrannical chains of the now antiquated traditional structure of their society.

In the face of the challenge of the dynamic West, the masses of the ex-colonies tend more often than not to become "nativistic" in their cultural outlook. As Heilbroner has pointed out, they "dream of the world they left" rather than of the world that is emerging from under their own feet. In the African scene this tendency has been "tagged" as aspiration to assert "African Personality", "Negritude", or "Pan-Africanism", wherein one finds the African intellectuals' attempt to ideologize what is being felt strongly by the less Westernized masses to lead whom is their historically determined vocation. Consequently, all political and cultural leaders in the emerging new Africa are also deeply committed nationalists, in spite of the fact that the very nation which they are devoting their lives to build is after the pattern inherited from the West, and not in any sense whatsoever a restoration of the old nation once occupied temporarily by a foreign power. They are painfully aware that, short of industrialization, their nation is doomed, and at this point of history there can be no industrialization of their nation short of Westernization.

This paradox inherent in their situation is not understood by the more tradition-bound masses who would take a much more simplified position and assault the intellectuals, urging them to become more aggressive against the West and all it stands for, including Christianity, the democratic ideal, and even the white race *per se*. This is reflected in the tremendous inroads of Islam into all parts of Black Africa under the guise of its being the black man's religion (while Christianity is alleged to be the white man's religion), or by the belligerent insistence upon "Black Government" or "majority rule by the Black Africans" in some countries.

Admittedly this makes it extremely awkward, to put it mildly, for the West to continue aiding African nations, but it is even more awkward for the leaders of the African nations to receive aid from the West. However, inasmuch as they cannot possibly move forward without an enormous amount of foreign aid, foreign trade, and foreign capital investment, the only recourse left open for them is to invite industrial powers in both the Western and Soviet blocs to help them. For to turn exclusively to one or the other is, seen from their emotional perspective of today, tantamount to succumbing to the neo-colonialism of either the West or the East.

A similar situation prevails both in Asia and in Latin America

with the following distinctions. Generally speaking, Asian nations, with their centuries-old cultures and civilization intertwined with highly sophisticated religions, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and the like, did not lose completely their respective national identities nearly as much as African tribal nations, although many of the thoroughly Westernized intellectuals have had to *rediscover* their own cultural heritage. Consequently, the main thrust of nationalism in Asia in recent years has been to restate in, or translate into, Western categories that which they had had as their own from time immemorial, or at least long before Western civilization came into being. This is quite a contrast to African nationalism whose main thrust is to restate in as nativistic terms as possible that which they inherited as a legacy of Western colonialism. Both are, however, equally unabashedly ethnocentric *vis-a-vis* the West.

In Latin America, where national independence is, in most instances, a century old, the impact of the post-industrial revolution has been felt largely from the penetration of the North American business and industry, especially of the U.S.A. For even after independence most of the Latin American nations have until very recently been ruled by neo-feudalistic regimes, by an aristocracy firmly established within the traditional social structure and culturally much more orientated towards Europe than towards North America, towards which economically they all have been more and more drawn in recent years.¹⁵

Such being the case, "The restlessness and the pressure for change in Latin America is not in revolt against Spain and Portugal, due to Communist influence. If responsibility has to be assigned to outside influence, it is rather the outpouring of American energy that has made the old ways no longer tenable."¹⁶ Furthermore, Latin American society has long been without a middle class as understood in Europe and North America, where "feudalism, with the emotional dependence of little men upon their patrons and strong personal bonds among persons of rigidly marked class differences" have long persisted.¹⁷

The newly awakened intellectuals in Latin America are thus confronted by a situation substantially different from either Africa or South-east Asia. For one thing, the Latin American intellectuals are intent on changing the traditional structure of their own society. They are much more revolutionary than African and Asian intellectuals put together, and their revolt is not against foreign powers

but against their own outmoded ruling regime which on the one hand invites North American business and industry into their country and profits from it enormously, and on the other hand resists social change which necessarily follows the introduction of modern industrial economy. It may very well be that "in a real sense the lack of modern colonial experience and the absence of really dangerous foreign enemies at the border tend to weaken the tendency toward constructive nation-building in the area".¹⁸ The closest to modern colonial invasion of Latin America has been the penetration of North American business and industry in recent decades.

In this situation Latin American intellectuals are caught without any relevant ideology to help them except Marxism. Roman Catholicism has been too closely identified with the traditional ruling classes at one level while, at another level, it has accommodated itself too much with the pre-Christian paganisms of the peasantry, so that it can hardly provide the relevant conceptual framework or ideological guidance so badly needed by the revolutionary intellectuals. As for Protestantism, it has in fact been mostly of the highly subjectivistic and pietistic types (such as Biblical Fundamentalists, Pentecostalists, and the like) which by the very otherworldliness of their theology are in no position to help the intellectuals standing at the crossroads of social, political, and economic revolutions happening all at once.¹⁹

Latin American intellectuals see how modern industrial civilization can liberate their society from all sorts of ills resulting from the antiquated feudalistic social structure, and yet their experience of it (as chiefly represented by North America) to date has been contrary to this expectation; it has at once caused the breakdown of old structures and attempted to perpetuate it unchanged. Hence what is potentially their greatest ally has so far been their worst enemy, and one with whom they hardly know how to cope. Little wonder that the attitude of the most alert Latin American intellectuals towards North America has been at best ambivalent, if not outright hostile.

7

So, the dynamic industrialism of the post-Industrial Revolution West has, in a profound sense, "Westernized" the rest of the world, and the areas once colonized by Western Powers are now, in the wake of decolonization, engaged desperately in the task of nation-building. Nationalism in those areas then is, as Mr M. M. Thomas of India has

often stated, at once a legacy of Western colonial rule of the colonies and the once-colonized peoples' reaction against it. In this process, different areas are reacting differently to the West, but all are trying to reorientate their relationships with the West. They are the first ones to realize that emancipation from the yoke of colonial rule does not mean that they can sever all relationships with the West, so that the first action of real consequence which they take after gaining independence has been to join the United Nations.

By the same token, the West has also to reorientate its relationships with the rest of the world. Until the Second World War, colonies in Africa and Asia, and pre-industrial nations in Latin America were, to the West, little more than its extensions or appendages, but today they stand on their own feet as independent nations (however small and weak they may be) and are fellow-members of the United Nations in their own right.

Nations of the Soviet Bloc likewise were to the West little other than ideological foes, but now they, too, are partners in the common struggle to build a new world society. All this, as I have repeatedly stated, has been chiefly due to the dynamism of the modern industrial civilization of the West.

Having brought this situation about, the West has been far too slow in reorientating its relationships with the rest of the world, especially with its ex-colonies. The West appears to have been, and still appears to be, a prisoner of its own past of colonial imperialism. Having sown the seed of a world-wide social revolution, the West, when it finally came about, has not recognized it. Having been so accustomed to the privileges which it enjoyed at the expense of the colonized peoples, the West appears to be adamantly reluctant to give them up and continues seemingly to treat the now independent nations as if they were "primitive" peoples or its own dependencies. Besides, at the time when the one-world society is dawning upon the whole of mankind, powerful nations of the West are still unreservedly resorting to power politics and cold war tactics in international relations, thereby victimizing small and frail developing nations. (Illustrations of this are many and so well known that none need be stated here.)

Human society today is confronted by no more serious issue than that of the growing economic gap, and the tensions accompanying it, between the "have-not" countries in the developing areas and the "have" countries in the industrial centres of the world. This issue,

one must be constantly reminded, cannot be adequately dealt with either by philanthropy (i.e. foreign aid from the rich nations to the poor nations), or by conquest, military or economic, of the weak nations by the strong, still less by ideological warfare, political, religious, or racial, between giant nations or blocs of nations. The world as a whole is in need of a radically new ethic to guide the nations, along with a radically new institutional framework within which they can unite their forces to build a new world society. For:

In the contest that divides the world today and in which so much is at stake, those will probably win who understand revolution, while those who still put their faith in power politics in the traditional sense of the term and, therefore, in war as the last resort of foreign policy may well discover in a not too distant future that they have become masters in a rather useless and obsolete trade.²⁰

Taken as a whole human society, whether at the global level or at the local level, does not leap from one stage, or type, of civilization to another in one big jump. While one segment or sector of it is well into the technological age, another is just barely leaving the pre-industrial age. This is illustrated most prominently by the coexistence of the pre-industrial cultures, of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the old world of Europe (*à la* Mr Lewis Mumford) in which the modern industrialism, the tradition of the Renaissance, and the legacy of the French Revolution are inseparably blended together, and the new world of North America where industrialism is about to be taken over by what is sometimes called cyberculture dominated by the latest product of technology, the computer machine. Not only do these three distinct types of human civilization coexist side by side with one another, but they are inseparably interwoven within the context of an ever-shrinking one-global society. At a time when Europe is at last attempting to become integrated as one economic community, Africa is torn apart by rejuvenated tribalism, and the United States, unmatched by any other nation or group of nations, despite her material wealth and military strength is pathologically preoccupied with what she thinks is the Communist menace. This is the picture of the world in 1967.

Likewise, the industrially developed society is inhabited simultaneously by pre-industrial man, by industrial man, and by post-industrial man, or man of technological civilization. In fact, it may not be too much of an exaggeration to say that Western man, generally speaking, is living in an industrial age with some deep-

rooted vestige of pre-industrial mentality and habit, even as he is crossing the threshold into the emerging technological age, even as people in the developing countries are forced to live the whole span of four hundred years or more of Western civilization (from feudalism to the technological age) in one generation.

What we see unfolding itself before our eyes is nothing but moral confusion caused by the coexistence of at least three different value systems, each of which is rooted in classical, pre-industrial democracy—the mass society which brought about modern industrialism—and the new structured society governed by technology or “techno-structure”, to recall Professor Galbraith’s phrase. Figuratively speaking the contemporary Western man (at least the one who reached his adulthood during the inter-war years and therefore is in a position of responsibility in various sectors of his national society) is living with one foot in the mass society and the other in the emerging affluent society of cyberculture, and with his head still in the classical democracy. As Canon Warren has aptly said, “Man is seldom contemporary with his own age.”

According to Dr Edward H. Carr, the mass democracy that arose following the French Revolution in the West, which has run its full course in the U.S.A., is also a logical consequence of the Industrial Revolution and has seriously challenged the three main propositions which had constituted the pillars of the classical democracy: “First that the individual conscience is the ultimate source of decisions about what is right and wrong; second, that there exists between different individuals a fundamental harmony of interests strong enough to enable them to live peacefully together in society; third, that where action has to be taken in the name of society, rational discussion between individuals is the best method of reaching a decision on that action.”²¹ In short, individualism, or the doctrine of the sovereignty of the individual with his “inalienable rights to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness”, as well as the innate capacity to know right and wrong, the doctrine of *laissez-faire* economics, or a society controlled by free market, and rationalism with its corollary, the belief in automatic progress of man’s society, was the bedrock on which the classical democracy stood.

The manner in which these propositions have been discredited during the past century is a story all too familiar to us and need not be discussed here,²² except by hinting at the moral and spiritual consequences. With industrialism accompanied by its emphasis on

mass production, standardization, emphasis on efficiency measured by tangible results, punctuality, and regularity, it was not long before the machine took over human efforts, personal ethics were eclipsed by collective behaviour, or by professional codes of ethics, and rationalism was replaced by positivism.

At the same time, modern industrialism has brought universal education into effect, which in turn has helped to implement the ideal of egalitarianism which is the other side of the same coin with "Sovereignty of the people as a whole". In this sense industrial civilization, or Mr Lewis Mumford's so-called "New World culture", has emancipated the masses from the rigidity of the stratification of the pre-industrial society, making vertical mobility in society possible and admissible.

This tremendous achievement of industrial civilization, however, has not been attained without an enormously high price in the moral and spiritual sphere. As Mr Lewis Mumford has written:

Observe what happened to the seven deadly sins of Christian theology. All but one of these sins, sloth, was transformed into a positive virtue. Greed, avarice, envy, gluttony, luxury and pride were the driving forces of the new economy. If once they were mainly the vices of the rich, they now under the doctrine of expanding wants embraced every class of society. Thus unbounded power was harnessed to equally unbounded appetites.²³

The fact that the culture of industrialism has brought forth, and been undergirded by what Max Weber and R. H. Tawney have called the Protestant Ethic does not need to be repeated here, except by adding that in the New World it blossomed fully as the Puritan Ethic, with an enormous emphasis on the fact that hard work in honest industry is the only honourable way of living for man.

How much this Puritan Ethic has caused the New World to move away from the Old World, is aptly shown by Dr Margaret Mead as far back as 1945:

The English still think of man as the junior partner of God. Sometimes they think of England specifically as a junior partner of God, but always as a junior partner. They have a picture of the world in which what man can do is very subordinate to that which is already given. And so the figures of speech that they employ most in human relations are horticultural. In England you have to talk about growth, cultivation, and process. You can plant, you can pray and you can water the seed, but you cannot be sure how the plant is going to grow . . .

With an American audience one uses such figures as these: we build, we construct, we draw blueprints, we engineer. We talk about human engineering and we give a picture, on the whole, of a people who are not the junior partner of God but just do not need God, a people who have a great big open country and who can fix it in any way they like.²⁴

8

Now we come to the post-war scene, which may be characterized by the phrase coined and popularized by Professor John Galbraith of Harvard, "the affluent society". According to Mr Robert Theobald, "abundance was created in America during the ten-year period after World War II. It therefore seems almost certain that the full effects of abundance will be felt in Europe within the next decade, for the economic position of many European nations is now considerably more advanced than that of America at the end of World War II." And so, Theobald boldly states that "abundance is a world-wide problem".²⁵ But why is abundance a problem?

"In the New World culture", according to Mr Mumford, "the human race as a whole was reinstated: each individual counted at least as a unit, if not fully a person. And participation in the highest grade of society was no longer confined to the 'elect'. That was a large human gain."²⁶ The sense of self-respect, thus restored in the common man has unleashed a tremendous amount of psychic energy and a high degree of motivation on their part to improve their standards of living by way of participating in the ever-growing industries.

But, paradoxically, the very success of industrialism has also created a new problem for man. "The industrial revolution started its career under the banner of individual enterprise . . . But presently the machine overtook the man, and the competitive advantages of mass production ushered in the age of standardization and larger and larger economic units."²⁷ The result is, "Not freedom and vitality, but power, regimentation, conformity and absolutism have now become the dominant elements in the New World culture: not least in countries where totalitarian automatism is quaintly called 'free enterprise' and generals and businessmen act in interchangeable roles."²⁸

Abundance has arrived, says Theobald, because:

Since the beginning of the industrial revolution we have witnessed a growing replacement of manpower by machine power, but man's skills were still essential to the utilization of machine power. The coming replacement of man's skills by the machine's skills will destroy many

jobs and render useless the work experience of vast numbers now employed . . .

This conclusion implies the *complete* breakdown of our present socio-economic system which depends on the ability to provide jobs for all who require them. The resulting situation is paradoxical. We are going to be able to produce more goods than ever before and we therefore have the ability to provide a standard of living compatible with the maintenance of human dignity for everybody.²⁹

If this is so, where is the trouble? According to Theobald, "because we still believe that the income levels of the vast majority of the population should depend on their ability to continue working, over 20 per cent of the American population is exiled from the abundant economy and this percentage will grow, rather than decline, in coming years".³⁰ The problem is thus more on the side of man's outlook or attitude than that of the machine. To quote Mr Mumford once more:

The very success of mechanization has put the products of high technology under the control of routiners, lovers of compulsion and conformity, whose chief concern is to keep the wheels running smoothly. . . . Instead of finding the rewards in the days' work, the majority of workers, high and low, look for their rewards outside it: in sports, excitement, luxury.

Ironically, these compulsory processes become subject to business enterprise (United States, England) or political direction (Soviet Russia, Communist China) and recreations in turn become standardized as the work they supposedly counteract. . . .³¹

From this and numerous other observations, testimonies, and studies,³² one can readily see how inadequate the ethical principles are in the contemporary society which used to guide Western man as recently as the inter-war years. More explicitly, ethics of individualism can no longer be viable today. Our world desperately needs ethics of corporation—business, industry, government—and of collective power of organized social structures, not based on a theology of natural law but firmly grounded in scientific understanding of the dynamics of post-industrial society.

For one thing, "Mass democracy has through its very nature, thrown up on all sides specialized groups of leaders—what are sometimes called 'élites'. Everywhere, in government, in political parties, in trade unions, in co-operatives, these indispensable 'élites' have taken shape with startling rapidity over the last thirty years. Everywhere the rift has widened between leaders and rank and file."³³

The rift takes two forms, according to Professor Carr. "In the first place, the interests of the leaders are no longer fully identical with those of the rank and file . . . Secondly, and most important of all, there is an ever-increasing gap between the terms in which an issue is debated and solved among leaders and the terms in which the same issue is presented to the rank and file." Consequently, "when the decision of substance has been taken by the leaders, whether of government, of party or of union, a further decision is often required of the best method of selling the decision . . . The spectacle of an efficient 'élite' maintaining its authority and asserting its will over the masses by the rationally calculated use of irrational methods of persuasion is the most disturbing nightmare of mass democracy."³⁴

Thus the affluent society of the West is at once rigidly structured, stratified, and fragmented, in which "the separately 'rational' actions of the various parts of society are the *same* actions that combined are shaking our total socio-economic system apart". Furthermore, "it is not the selfish actions of evil men that are causing today's major problems, but the 'rational' decisions of the highly respected corporate heads, the energetic union leader, and the concerned cabinet member."³⁵ Under these circumstances, it is not at all surprising if the "New World man too often showed himself more savage than the most primitive groups whose cultures he despoiled . . . Had New World man shown more understanding of the whole range of primitive gifts, too often despised and cast aside, he would have left mankind as a whole both wiser and richer."³⁶

The problem inherent in the affluent society, increasingly automated and cybernated, is thus shown up as basically spiritual and therefore theological. When, on the international level, the gap in living standards grows from year to year between rich nations and poor nations, and, on the national level also, between the traditionally privileged dominant group and the historically dispossessed minority groups—when the rich will not face this situation as their own problem, they are spiritually dead. It may be most appropriate at this point for us to recall that well-known dictum of Archbishop William Temple: "One's own bread is a material problem but bread for one's neighbour is a spiritual problem."

But how should the Church tackle this problem when Society has become such a mammoth structure in which "those in control of most types of organizations have little freedom of choice in their actions"³⁷ not to mention the rank and file of the masses? The

Church's task in the midst of a rigidly controlled society is that of helping man to restore his "inner ability to govern himself, and a conscientious search for meaning despite the realization that, as far as we know, there is no purpose to one's life."³⁸

Ultimately, the issue facing modern man everywhere, but more especially in the affluent West, is his "experience of growing vagueness about who one is, the sense of restricted autonomy". For he is living in "a mass society in which people no longer react spontaneously and autonomously to the vagaries of life, but are ready to accept uncritically the solutions that others offer".³⁹

But how can man regain "the ability to 'be oneself' in the managed society"? Currently, growing numbers of people, as Mumford has pointed out, are resorting to a variety of leisure-time activities or withdrawing into private worlds of their own making. "It is questionable, however, to what extent most of the leisure-time activities engaged in by most people today are really creative enough to help them regain their self-respect and autonomy as persons."⁴⁰

Here at this point Dr Bettelheim's warning to modern man is in itself a challenge to the Church: "The more mechanized and fragmented the world around us, the more we must develop the humanity of human relations. The more we live in a mass society, the better we must know how to have intimate relations."⁴¹ Our society needs integrated personalities with strong inner convictions who are constantly nourished by satisfying personal relations and who are equipped with "the intellectual mastery of events as they happen".⁴² When the technologically most advanced countries tend to be "nations of sheep, willing to give up personal identity and individualized way of life and letting themselves be managed", should not the greatest vocation of the Church be to become "a sizable minority who resist such a fate", whereby to stand as "the greatest hope of mankind" as well as to subvert, in the most profound sense of the phrase, the affluent, powerful, but oppressive and dehumanizing, structure of modern society? Is the Christian faith which we Anglicans profess strong enough to equip us for such a vocation?

Epilogue

From the foregoing discussion on major characteristics of human society at present, the following issues, among others, suggest themselves to be of crucial importance for the Church to face. What can,

and should the Church in general, and the Anglican Communion in particular, do about them?

1. The issue of conflict inherent in our society between:

(a) Technologically advanced nations in the industrial centres of the world and underdeveloped nations in the areas which have once been colonized by the industrial powers;

(b) the privileged segment and the dispossessed segment within an increasingly and manifestly affluent society, on the local, national, and international levels;

(c) racial and ethnic groups which *ipso facto* constitute socio-economic strata within a given society;

(d) different professional groups, or between highly organized groups committed to different interests, objectives, causes, etc.

2. The issue of the apparently inevitable concentration of power in tightly organized social structures, such as political, industrial, financial, and business institutions.

3. The issue of what may be summarily called "youth culture"—of the now maturing generation which has been born into the affluent society and has not known, at first hand at any rate, anything of human society under an economy of scarcity, but at the same time has somehow taken cognizance of many unsavoury and even phony aspects of the otherwise prosperous and glorious-looking contemporary society. Some of them are rebelling against it (new radical left, etc.), some are trying to escape it (resorting to psychedelic drugs, etc.), and others are turning in the direction of neo-hedonism of various sorts.

4. The issue of personality disintegration (*à la* Dr Bettelheim or Dr Erich Fromm⁴³) in a mass society which is at once hopelessly fragmented and rigidly structured, being more and more controlled by dehumanizing powers to work underneath and behind its superstructures. The seriousness of this issue is evidenced by the increasing rate of suicides, alcoholics, dope-addicts, sexual promiscuity, broken families, and murders of incredible brutality among otherwise civilized people.

5. The issue of a growing tendency toward amorality inherent in the principle of prudential ethics underlying all professional codes of ethics. The professional code of ethics which, unless accepted, prevents anyone from practising his profession, and which, once

accepted, protects the practitioner of any profession as long as he does not violate it (actually, in so doing it is more likely than not to dehumanize his professional life, preventing him from making ethically responsible decisions when faced by many a moral issue).

6. The issue of education, both general and specialized, in the period of transition from industrial to technological age. What specific roles do educational institutions, *per se*, and especially institutions of higher education, have to play when people, both youths and adults, are constantly "educated" via all sorts of mass media of communication? Should the university be content with turning out specially trained "technicians" in a variety of professions? How can people be educated so as to be contemporary with their times?

7. The issue of parochialism and provincialism in an age of cosmopolis. The renaissance of tribalism in many parts of the world, racial discrimination, xenophobia, the cult of congeniality of like people, the idolization of homogeneity of neighbourhood, racial, cultural, or, otherwise, pathological fear of interracial marriage or miscegenation on the part of surprisingly large numbers of people in all parts of the world, indicate that man is still a prisoner of in-group or ghetto mentality.

8. Issues centred on the roles and functions of the family in industrial and post-industrial society. In pre-industrial civilizations the family used to be simultaneously an economic unit, an educational institution for the young, and a depository of culture. However, in industrial and post-industrial civilizations, the family *per se* occupies a much less important place in man's life. Is then the family going to be, if it is not already, obsolete? What decisive roles or functions will be left for the family to play in tomorrow's society?

9. Issues centred on the newly emerging place, role, and function of women in industrial and technological society. The issue of equality of men and women in the context of their partnership, one with the other, in all walks of life. What, if any, are the functional differences between men and women which are rooted in the order of creation and not in the conditioning of culture in history?

10. Issues centred on the ministry of the laity and parish structure (or locally organized congregations) within the context of the sprawling metropolis and inevitable fragmentation of human life into several,

not always mutually interrelated, sections: occupational, family and private, civic and political, recreational, intellectual, cultural, etc. Is a healthy Christian life conceivable apart from an organized community of the faithful? What are some of the bases on which a creative fellowship of Christians can be built, which in turn may become something of a therapeutic community to help modern men and women restore their personality and humanize their interpersonal relationships? What does it mean, in substance, that the laity, as the People of God, have, both corporately and individually, a definite part in the Church's mission and ministry in and to the world? What will be the unique functions of the ordained clergy within the framework of the local congregation from now on?

To sum it all up, the question challenging the Christian Church today is: How can she spell out and proclaim what a wholesome human personality and a sane society are like and how can she help to produce them in what Professor Boulding calls post-civilized society?